Mercer Law Review
Volume 49
Number 4 Annual Eleventh Circuit Survey

Article 11

7-1998

Trial Practice and Procedure
Philip W. Savrin
Robyn L. Oliver

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Litigation Commons

Recommended Citation
Savrin, Philip W. and Oliver, Robyn L. (1998) "Trial Practice and Procedure," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 49 :
No. 4 , Article 11.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol49/iss4/11

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Trial Practice and Procedure
by Philip W. Savrin"
and
Robyn L. Oliver"
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys the 1997 decisions of the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals that have a significant impact on issues relating to trial
practice and procedure.
I. JUDICIAL NOTICE AND SUPPLEMENTATION OF THE RECORD
A party's ability to supplement the record was the issue in Shahar v.
Bowers.' The court considered a decision by Georgia's Attorney General
to revoke an offer of employment previously extended to Shahar because
Shahar publicized her marriage to a person of the same sex. Shahar
filed suit alleging the decision violated her constitutional rights to
freedom of association, equal protection, and due process. The district

court granted summary judgment in favor of Attorney General Bowers,
and Shahar appealed.2

Following an affirmance en banc by the

Eleventh Circuit, Shahar petitioned for rehearing, seeking in part to
supplement the record with two newspaper articles reporting that the
Attorney General, who had made the employment decision, had admitted
to having an adulterous affair in the past. Shahar requested that this
* Partner in the firm of Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Clark
University (BA., with high honors, 1981); Boston University (J.D., cur laude, 1985). Law
Clerk to the Honorable Harold L. Murphy of the Northern District of Georgia, 1988-1990.
Staff Attorney, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 1985-1988.
Member, American Bar Association, State Bar of Georgia, Atlanta BarAssociation, Federal
Bar Association.
** Associate in the firm of Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Auburn
University (B.S., 1992); Mercer University (J.D., 1996). Member, American Bar
Association, State Bar of Georgia, Atlanta Bar Association.
1. 120 F.3d 211 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 693 (1998).
2. Shahar v. Bowers, 836 F. Supp. 859 (1993).
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information become part of the record by judicial notice or through
remand to the district court for further discovery.'
Ruling again en banc, the court of appeals recognized that while it has
the "inherent equitable power to supplement the record with information4
not reviewed by the district court," it is generally reluctant to do so.
Indeed, to supplement the record "would be an especially extraordinary
event and would require the clearest showing ofjust need to warrant the
supplementation."' In this case one factor that was found to weigh
strongly against supplementation was an agreement by the parties early
in the litigation not to propound discovery concerning the sexual history
of the other party." The hearsay information contained in the newspaper articles concerning the adulterous affair was deemed to be encompassed by the terms of this agreement.7 Consequently, had it not been
for the voluntary agreement, Shahar could have obtained the information contained in the articles through the normal course of discovery. As
it stood, Shahar "did not diligently seek out this information when the
information could have been regularly considered by the district court
and then by the court of appeals."8 Accordingly, the court held that
Shahar's request to supplement the record through remand was
procedurally barred.9
The court also declined to supplement the record through judicial
notice."° The court recognized that "the taking of judicial notice
bypasses the safeguards which are involved with the usual process of
proving facts by competent evidence."" Consequently, while it is
appropriate to take judicial notice of a person's official conduct, the court
would not extend judicial notice to "the unofficial conduct of one person
based upon newspaper accounts (or the person's campaign committee's
press release) about that conduct." 2
III.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

In United States v. Banks,"8 the Eleventh Circuit analyzed and
addressed the procedure for determining the applicable statute of

3. 120 F.3d at 212.
4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id.

Id.
Id. at 213.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 214.
Id.
Id.

13. 115 F.3d 916 (11th Cir. 1997).
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limitations when a substantive federal statute does not specify a
limitations period. In Banks the Government brought a civil proceeding
seeking to enjoin Banks (a landowner) from discharging waste material
into United States waters under the Clean Water Act ("OWA'). The trial
court entered judgment against Banks, and he appealed on several
grounds including that the Government's equitable action was barred by
the applicable statute of limitations.14
The court acknowledged that when a statute does not specify a
limitations period, the default limitations provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2462
would normally apply.'" This section provides: "Except as otherwise
provided by Act of Congress, an action, suit or proceeding for the
enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or
otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years
from the date when the claim first accrued."
However, because the "plain language of [the default limitations
provision] does not apply to equitable remedies," Banks argued that the
"concurrent remedy rule" should apply instead.1" Under the concurrent
remedy rule, "'equity will withhold its relief... where the applicable
statute of limitations would bar the concurrent legal remedy.' 17 In
this case the concurrent remedy, a legal action under the CWA, would
arguably be covered by the default limitation provision, and the action
would be time-barred."8
In support of his argument, Banks relied on United States v.
Windward Properties,Inc. 9 In Windward the district court applied the
concurrent remedy rule to bar the Government's action for equitable
relief and civil penalties under the CWA.2 ° The court of appeals
disagreed with the district court's analysis in Windward because it failed
to address the general rule that "'an action on behalf of the United
States in its governmental capacity ...is subject to no time limitation,
in the absence of congressional enactment clearly imposing it.'" 2' In
addition, an application of the rule would run afoul of the "canon of
statutory construction that 'any statute of limitations sought to be
applied against the United States "must receive a strict construction in
favor of the government.""
14. Id. at 918.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 919.
17. Id (quoting Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 464 (1947)).

18. Id.
19. 821 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ga. 1993).

20. Banks, 115 F.3d at 919 (citing Windward, 821 F. Supp. at 693).
21. Id. (quoting E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456, 462 (1924)).

22. Id. (quoting United States v. Alvarado, 5 F.3d 1425, 1428 (11th Cir. 1993)).
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In light of these considerations, the court of appeals held that a
statute of limitations "is enforced against the government only when the
government is acting to vindicate private interests, not a sovereign or
public interest."' Consequently, because the Government in this case
sought "relief in its official enforcement capacity," the concurrent remedy
rule could not properly be invoked, and the Government's action was not
time-barred.24
IV.

ADDITuR/SEVENTH AMENDMENT

The right to a jury trial on the issue of damages was addressed by the
Eleventh Circuit in EEOC v. Massey Yardley Chrysler Plymouth, Inc.25
In that case the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
alleged that defendant employer had unlawfully discriminated against
a female employee "by subjecting her to a hostile work environment and
harassing and constructively discharging her because of her age" in
violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). 26 A
jury found that defendant had subjected the employee to a hostile work
environment but that the discrimination was not willfull. Because the
ADEA authorizes liquidated damages for willfull discrimination only, the
employee was awarded back pay but did not receive liquidated damages.
In addition, the back pay award was significantly less than the total
amount of pay the employee would have received had she continued to
work between the time of her constructive discharge and the employer's
offer to reinstate her.27 Not surprisingly, the EEOC moved to conform
the damages to the evidence by increasing the award to match the actual
amount of back pay due to the employee.2"
The court of appeals began by recognizing that "once liability for
harassment and constructive discharge on the basis of age is established,
the injured victim is presumptively entitled to back pay from the date
of the discriminatory discharge until the date of judgment, unless the
victim obtained or could have obtained substantially equivalent work
before that time."29 The Seventh Amendment generally prohibits a
trial court from increasing a jury award except "where the jury has
found the underlying liability and there is no genuine issue as to the

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id
117 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1246.
Id. at 1246, 1251.
Id. at 1249.
Id. at 1251.
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correct amount of damages." 0 Because the jury found the defendant
liable for discrimination and there was no dispute about the correct
amount of back pay, the court determined the district court had the
authority to adjust the back pay award without violating the Seventh
Amendment. 31 Accordingly, the court vacated the award and remanded
the case with instructions to conform the damages to the evidence. 2
V. JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES

PersonalJurisdiction Under RICO
In Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A,3 the
Republic of Panama ("Panama") brought suit in Florida under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO")" against
several foreign and domestic banking entities. In its complaint Panama
alleged that these entities had assisted Manuel Noriega, a former
military officer of Panama, in unlawfully obtaining money from Panama.
One of the defendants had its principal place of business in the District
of Columbia, and another had its principal place of business in New
York City. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of
held that Panama
personal jurisdiction and in an alternative ruling
35
failed to state a claim under the RICO statute.
Panama appealed, claiming the district court had jurisdiction over
defendants under RICO's nationwide service of process provision.3 6
Under this provision "process may be served 'on any person in any
judicial district in which such person resides, is found, has an agent, or
transacts his affairs.'"3 7 In response, defendants urged the court "to
put aside the jurisdictional issue and first review the district court's
alternative ruling under [rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure] addressing the merits of Panama's RICO claim." 8
Before reaching the merits of Panama's RICO claim, the court
recognized that it must first decide the personal jurisdiction issue
because a "defendant that is not subject to the jurisdiction of the court
A.

30. Id. at 1252.

31. Id
32. Id. at 1253.
33.
34.

35.
36.
37.
38.

119 F.3d 935 (11th Cir. 1997).

18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1990 (1994).
BCC, 119 F.3d at 939-40.
Id. at 940.
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1965(d)).
Id.
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cannot be bound by its rulings." 9 In addition, a dismissal on the
merits would be with prejudice, whereas a dismissal based on personal
jurisdiction would be without prejudice.' The court declined to adopt
the approach utilized by some courts whereby the issue of personal
jurisdiction is not decided "if the decision on the merits would favor the
party challenging jurisdiction and the jurisdictional issue is difficult. " 4 '
Because the jurisdictional question facing the court had resulted in
inconsistent holdings within the Eleventh Circuit, the court determined
it would "clarify the distinction between what a plaintiff asserting
jurisdiction under a federal statute must allege to survive a defendant's
12(b)(1) or 12(b)(2) motion on the one hand, and a defendant's 12(b)(6)
motion on the other."2
A plaintiff asserting jurisdiction under a federal statute must allege
only a claim under that statute that is "not wholly immaterial or
insubstantial" in order to take or utilize the statute's nationwide service
of process provision.4 Because Panama had asserted a viable claim,
RICO provides for nationwide service of process, and because defendants
"are domestic corporations doing business in this country, the statutory
basis for personal jurisdiction over these defendants [was] satisfied.""
The court then turned to the constitutional question of whether
compelling defendants to litigate in Florida would comport with Fifth
Amendment Due Process protections. The court determined there is
no reason why the policies behind the Fourteenth Amendment decisions
of the Supreme Court should not apply to jurisdictional challenges under
a federal statute.4 6 Consequently, in "order to evaluate whether the
Fifth Amendment requirements of fairness and reasonableness have
been satisfied, courts should balance the burden imposed on the
individual defendant against the federal interest involved in the
litigation." 7 This balancing test requires courts to determine if
important
governmental interests justify an infringement on individual
48
liberty.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43,
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. (citing Madara v. Hall, 916 F.3d 1510, 1513-14 and n.1 (11th Cir. 1990)).

Id.
Id. at 941.
Id.
Id. at 942.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 946.
Id.
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This balancing test is required only, however, "if the defendant has
established that his liberty interests have actually been infringed."49
Whether a defendant has satisfied this burden depends on the same
factors considered in determining fairness under the Fourteenth
These factors include an examination of "defendant's
Amendment.'
aggregate contacts with the nation as a whole rather than his contacts
with the forum state."5 1 The court cautioned, however, that even if a
defendant has sufficient contacts, "courts must insure that requiring a
defendant to litigate in plaintiff's chosen forum is not unconstitutionally
burdensome." 2 Indeed, it is the defendant's burden to demonstrate
that litigation in the plaintiff's chosen forum is so inconvenient as to rise
to a constitutional concern." If the defendant satisfies this burden,
"jurisdiction will comport with due process only if the federal interest in
litigating the dispute in the chosen forum outweighs the burden imposed
on the defendant." 4 In making this determination, "courts should
examine the federal policies advanced by the statute, the relationship
between nationwide service of process and the advancement of these
policies, the connection between the exercise ofjurisdiction in the chosen
forum and the plaintiff's vindication of his federal right, and concerns of
judicial efficiency and economy."5 The court noted that when a statute
provides for nationwide service of process, it should be assumed "that
nationwide personal jurisdiction is necessary to further congressional
objectives."
The court held that personal jurisdiction over defendants in this case
was proper, in part because "defendants are large corporations providing
banking services to customers in major metropolitan areas along the
eastern seaboard."57 Consequently, defendants' lack of contact with
Florida did not make litigating in that state unreasonably inconvenient.5" In addition, because discovery would be conducted throughout
the world, Florida was not necessarily any more inconvenient than
another location in the United States. 9 Accordingly, the court found
that the defendants had not satisfied their burden in establishing that

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 947.

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 948.

55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.

59. Id.
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Florida would be such an inconvenient forum as to raise a constitutional
issue. 6°
Personal Jurisdictionover Aliens
A similar issue to the one in BCCI was addressed by the court in SEC
61 In this case the Securities and Exchange Commission
v. Carrillo.
("SEC") filed a complaint against a Costa Rican corporation and two
Costa Rican citizens alleging that defendants "fraudulently offered and
sold unregistered securities to United States residents to finance [the:
corporation's] operations."62 The district court dismissed the SEC's
claims based on lack of personal jurisdiction, and the SEC appealed.'
In its personal jurisdiction analysis, the court noted that although it
had never
B.

set forth a rule for identifying the relevant forum-the United States
or the state where the district court sits-for purposes of minimum
contacts analysis in a non-diversity action involving an alien defendant
...

a survey of our precedents reveals that we generally have deemed

the applicable forum for minimum contacts purposes to be the United
States in cases where, as here, service of process has been effected
pursuant to a federal statute authorizing nationwide or worldwide
service."
The court recognized that the majority of circuits has determined that
a federal statute's nationwide or worldwide service provision broadens
a court's scope of personal jurisdiction and that in this context "'the
question becomes whether the party has sufficient contacts with the
United States, not any particular state."' 5 The court also recognized
that the jurisdictional concerns present in a diversity case "are absent
in a federal question case [and] a federal court's power to assert personal
Accordingly, because
jurisdiction is geographically expanded.'
personal jurisdiction in this case was based on a federal statute
authorizing nationwide or worldwide service of process, the court
concluded that "the proper forum for minimum contacts analysis is the
United States.' 7

60, Id.
61, 115 F.3d 1540 (11th Cir. 1997).
62. Id. at 1541.
63, Id.
64. Id. at 1542-43.
65. Id. (quoting Go-Video, Inc. v. Akai Elec. Co., 855 F.2d 1406, 1414 (9th Cir. 1989)).
66. Id. (citing United Elec. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1085 (lst
Cir. 1992)).
67. Id. at 1544.
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C. Diversity-Amount in Controversy
The amount in controversy requirement for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction was addressed by the Eleventh Circuit in Ericsson GE
Mobile Communications, Inc. v. Motorola Communications & Electronics." Plaintiff, an unsuccessful bidder for a communications contract
with the City of Birmingham, brought an action in federal court to
enjoin the execution of the contract between the city and the successful
bidder. Specifically, plaintiff alleged the other communications company
exerted bias over the city in violation of Alabama's competitive bid law.
Plaintiff claimed the amount in controversy was sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of diversity jurisdiction. The district court adopted an
advisory jury's verdict for plaintiff, and defendant appealed.6 9
Before reaching the merits of the case, the court considered whether
the action was properly in federal court.7" Because plaintiff sought
injunctive relief only, the amount in controversy must be measured "'by
The court acknowledged
the value of the object of the litigation."''
that there was a conflict among the circuits, and even within the
Eleventh Circuit, regarding whether that value must be determined
"solely from the plaintiff's perspective or whether [the court] may also
consider the value of the object from the defendant's perspective."72
The court resolved this conflict by reviewing cases from the former Fifth
Circuit, which it concluded established the plaintiff-viewpoint rule.7 3
The court thus held that it was "bound to follow the plaintiff-viewpoint
rule regardless of the wisdom we may attach to it."74
In applying the plaintiff-viewpoint rule, the court considered whether
plaintiff had alleged a sufficient amount in controversy to satisfy the
diversity requirements.7" A review of Alabama state law revealed that
the only remedy available to plaintiff was an injunction voiding the
76
contract between the other communication company and the city.
Because the potential "injunctive relief awardable by the district
court--namely, the chance to rebid for the contract-is, in our view, too
speculative and immeasurable to satisfy the amount in controversy

68.

120 F.3d 216 (11th Cir. 1997).

69. id. at 217-18.
70. Id. at 218.
71. Id. (quoting Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 345
(1977)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 219.
74. Id. at 220.
75. Id. at 221.
76. Id
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requirement," the court held that plaintiff had failed to satisfy the fiftythousand dollar amount in controversy requirement.7 7 Accordingly, the
case was remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction.78
D. Appellate Jurisdiction-CollateralOrder Doctrine
Whether the denial of a motion to dismiss is appealable under the
collateral order doctrine was the issue in Jordan v. AVCO Financial
Services of Georgia, Inc.79 In Jordan consumers brought a lawsuit
against several insurance companies alleging that these companies
"fraudulently induced [the consumers] to purchase 'non-filing insurance,'
which the plaintiffs allege is not, in fact, insurance, but is an undisclosed
finance charge." 0 Defendant insurance companies moved to dismiss
plaintiffs' federal claims arguing that the McCarran-Ferguson Act
("Act")81 "grants them immunity from suit because this dispute is
covered by state insurance law." 2 The Act "determines whether state
laws regulating insurance or federal laws related to insurance will apply
in a given controversy."8
The jurisdictional issue before the court was whether it could hear the
appeal of the trial court's denial of defendants' motion to dismiss
pursuant to the collateral order doctrine." The final judgment rule,
codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1291, prohibits "'appeals, even from fully
consummated decisions, where they are but steps towards final judgment
in which they will merge.'"8 5 The collateral order doctrine provides an
exception to the application of the final judgment rule but is "limited to
orders that (1). conclusively determine (2) important legal questions
which are (3) completely separate from the merits of the underlying
action and are (4) effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment."8 Defendants argued that the denial of their motion to
dismiss satisfied the requirements of the collateral order doctrine
because "it is analogous to the issue of immunity," which 8is7 generally
immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine.

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 221-22.
Id.
117 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1255.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1994).
117 F.3d at 1255.
Id. at 1257.
Id. at 1256.
Id. (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)).
Id. (citing Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546).
Id at 1257.
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The court disagreed with defendants because it found that the Act
"does not provide immunity to insurance companies against suit in
federal court."' The Act does not mention immunity, and it "does not
allow federal laws of general application to invalidate state insurance
laws."89 Indeed, the Act "is a statute of preemption rather than one
granting immunity.' ° Therefore, because the "Act does not provide
immunity to suit, but rather a defense to liability under federal statutes
of general application, the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the
applicability of the Act to this controversy is not immediately appealable
under the collateral order doctrine."9 '
VI. REMOVAL AND REMAND
In In re Bethesda Memorial Hospital, Inc.,' the Eleventh Circuit
reviewed a sua sponte order of a district court remanding a proceeding
to state court. This case arose out of plaintiff's employment discrimination suit against several defendants. Two of the defendants independently sought removal, which resulted in the case being docketed in two
separate district courts."' Upon learning of this situation, one of the
district court judges sua sponte entered an order remanding the case
docketed in his court back to the state court, "citing the failure of all
defendants to either join in [defendant's] petition for removal or manifest
their consent thereto."' Plaintiff then filed a successful remand motion
in the other district court. Defendants sought appellate review of the
sua sponte order and a writ of mandamus compelling the district court
to reinstate the case on its docket.9
The court began by determining whether it had jurisdiction to review
the district court's sua sponte remand order.16 Although remand orders
issued under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) are generally not reviewable on appeal
or otherwise, subsection (c) expressly limits this prohibition to remand
orders based upon "(1) lack of a district court's subject matter jurisdiction; or (2) a motion to remand the case filed within [thirty] days of the
notice of removal which is based upon a defect in the removal proce-

88. Id.
89.
90.
91.
92,
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id. at 1258.
Id.
123 F.3d 1407 (11th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1409,
Id.
Id. at 1408-09.
Id. at 1409.
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dure."97 Previously, the court had declined to decide whether it could
"review a remand order based on an untimely motion to remand for
defects in the removal procedure."'
However, because the district
court did not comply with the grounds for remand contained in section
1447(c), the court concluded that it was not barred from appellate review
of the district court's sua sponte remand order."
After concluding that the remand order was reviewable, the court then
addressed an issue of first impression, namely "the propriety of
remanding for procedural defects after thirty days of the notice of
removal. " 1" Without deciding the issue of whether a district court
could remand sua sponte, the court held that a district court is bound by
the thirty day limit contained in section 1447(c). 0 1 Because the "court
acted outside of its statutory authority by remanding for a procedural
defect after thirty days of the notice of removal," the court directed the
issuance of a writ of mandamus instructing the district court to recall
the remand and to reinstate the case on its docket. 2
VII. POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS
Whether a party can introduce new evidence in a motion for reconsideration of the entry of summary judgment was the issue in Mays v.
United States Postal Service. "

In this case plaintiff claimed that she

had been terminated on the basis of her race and sex in violation of Title
VII. Defendant employer denied the claim and moved for summary
judgment, arguing plaintiff did not perform adequately during her
probationary employment period. The district court dismissed plaintiff's
Title VII claim finding that she had been terminated for failure to
satisfy performance requirements. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration in which she submitted affidavits from several of her former
coworkers that supported her claims. The district court denied her
motion for reconsideration, and plaintiff appealed.'O°
The Eleventh Circuit characterized plaintiff's motion for reconsideration as a "Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment, rather than
a Rule 60 motion for relief from the judgment" because plaintiff sought
the reversal of the grant of summary judgment."5 Although the court
97. Id.
98. Id.at 1410.

99. Id.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id. at 1410-11.
Id. at 1411.
122 F.3d 43 (11th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 44-45.
Id.at 46.
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of appeals had previously held that a party should not use a motion to
reconsider to assert new theories of law, it had not determined whether
a party could introduce new evidence post-judgment."° In this case
the court joined the majority of circuits "in holding that where a party
attempts to introduce previously unsubmitted evidence on a motion to
reconsider, the court should not grant the motion absent some showing
that the evidence was not available during the pendency of the
motion.""° Because the plaintiff failed to even allege that she could
not have introduced the evidence prior to the district court's grant of
defendant's motion for summary judgment, the court affirmed the
district court's denial of plaintiff's motion for reconsideration."°
VIII.

PREEMPTION

In Williams Farms of Homestead, Inc. v. Rain & Hail Insurance
Services, Inc.,"° the Eleventh Circuit addressed the issues of whether
the Federal Crop Insurance Act ("FCIA)" 0 provides for a federal cause
of action by an insured against the insured's private insurance company
and, if not, whether it preempts a suit against a private insurance
company."' Plaintiffs in this case were insured under multi-peril crop
insurance policies issued by defendant insurance company. These
policies were issued subject to the FCIA and were reinsured by the
Federal Crop Insurance Corporation ("FCIC"). After plaintiffs' claims
under the insurance policies were denied, plaintiffs filed a complaint
against defendant but not against the FCIC. The district court
dismissed the claim without prejudice to allow plaintiffs to sue the FCIC.
Plaintiffs appealed.'
The issue of whether the FCIA provides for a cause of action against
a private insurer was deemed a question of first impression."' Under
the FCIA, the FCIC "both insures farmers directly and reinsures private
companies who insure farmers." 4 Following a 1980 amendment to
the FCIA, federal district courts were given exclusive original jurisdiction over suits brought by or against the FCIC."' Because the provi-

106. Id. (citing ONeal v. Kennamer, 958 F.2d 1044, 1047 (11th Cir. 1992)).
107. Id.

108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
121 F.3d 630 (11th Cir. 1997).
7 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1521 (1994).
121 F.3d at 632.

112. Id. at 631-32.

113. Id. at 633.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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sions of the FCIA provide for actions against the FCIC only, the court
agreed "with the district court that none of these provisions in the FCIA
create a federal cause of action against a private insurance company
reinsured by the FCIC."116
The court next had to determine whether the FCIA preempted claims
against private insurance companies in order to determine whether the
district court could assume diversity jurisdiction over the action.117
The court found no express preemption in the statute itself.'
In
addition, because there was no mention in the legislative history of
preemption, it was clear that Congress did not even "consider preventing
farmers from suing their private insurance company when that
insurance company denies their claim."" 9 Indeed, "Congress intended
to leave insureds with their traditional contract remedies against their
insurance companies."12 Consequently, the court concluded that the
FCIA does not grant federal question jurisdiction, does not preempt suits
against private insurance companies, and does not establish venue. 2 '
IX.

ABSTENTION

1llis Trucking Co., 122 the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court's dismissal of a federal action
in favor of a pending state case. This litigation resulted from an
accident between a tractor trailer and an automobile. The estate of the
driver of the automobile brought a wrongful death action in state court
against the company that owned the tractor trailer under Alabama's
wrongful death statute. The company's insurer provided the defense for
all defendants involved. 123 Following a seven million dollar award in
punitive damages against the truck driver and his employer, the insurer
filed a declaratory judgment action in federal court seeking a declaration
that
In Old Republic Union Insurance Co. v.

(1) the Alabama Wrongful Death Statute ... is unconstitutional; (2)

the Alabama Wrongful Death Statute, if constitutional, cannot be
constitutionally enforced against [the insurer] or any other insurer; (3)

[the insurer's] liability to the defendants cannot exceed the one million

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id. at 633-34.
Id at 634.
Id.
Id at 635.
Id.
124 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 1997).
Id. at 1259-60.
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dollar policy limit of its commercial automobile insurance policy with
the insured."
Subsequent to the filing of the declaratory action, the estate of the
automobile driver filed an action in state court seeking an order
compelling the insurer to tender the limits of its policy to plaintiff in
partial satisfaction of the earlier state court judgment. The district court
then dismissed the insurer's declaratory judgment action "without
prejudice in favor of the pending second state action."'
The insurer
appealed. 26
Relying on Younger v. Harris,27 the Eleventh Circuit applied three
factors to determine if the district court's abstention was appropriate:
"[First, do the proceedings constitute an ongoing state judicial proceeding; second, do the proceedings implicate important state interests; and
third, is there an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise
constitutional challenges."'
Although the state court action was filed
after the federal declaratory judgment action, the court found it
constituted an ongoing state judicial proceeding." 2 It also found that
the insurer "has an adequate opportunity to raise in state court any
constitutional objections it has to the Alabama Wrongful Death
Statute."13° The court did not agree with the insurer that adverse
Alabama precedent rendered the insurer unable to present its arguments
to an Alabama state court because the futility of a substantive argument
does not serve to defeat abstention.' 3 '
In determining whether the pending state action against the insurer
involved a sufficiently important state interest, the court found the
possibility that the Alabama Wrongful Death Statute would be declared
unconstitutional "would not only interfere with partial satisfaction of the
wrongful death judgment against [the insurer] by means of an enforcement action" 13 2 but would force the district court "to find that Alabama
state courts are incapable of enforcing the federal constitution in this
context.""" In addition, the insurer had failed to establish that the
"Alabama Wrongful Death Statute is 'flagrantly and patently violative

124.

Id. at 1260.

125. Id.
126. Id.
127. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
128. 124 F.3d at 1261 (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar
Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
129. Id. at 1261-62.
130. Id. at 1262.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1263.
133. I&
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of express constitutional prohibitions,' or that the Alabama courts are
applying the statute in bad faith, or that other internal 'extraordinary
circumstances' are present, as would be necessary to make an exception
to the Younger rule."'
Because this action satisfied all three factors
of the Younger abstention doctrine, the court affirmed the dismissal. 1 5
X.

ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIE DEATH PENALTY ACT

In In re Hill, 8" an inmate convicted of murder and sentenced to
death applied for leave to file a second or successive petition for a writ
of habeas corpus. The Eleventh Circuit analyzed Hill's application under
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"). 8 7
Under the AEDPA, successive habeas corpus petitions may be filed only
if:
(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the
Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or (B)(i) the factual
predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously
through the exercise of due diligence; and (ii) the facts underlying the
claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would
be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for
constitutional error, no reasonable fact finder would have found the
applicant guilty of the underlying offense."

In this case Hill's second habeas petition asserted a Cage claim-the
petition asserted that "the Alabama trial court deprived [Hill] of due
process by improperly instructing the jury with regard to reasonable
doubt during the capital trial." 39 Hill argued that because this claim
was not established until the 1990 Supreme Court decision in Cage v.
Louisiana,"4 his petition was exempt from the AEDPA successive
petition bar because it was based upon a new rule of constitutional
law.141
In order to resolve this issue, the court had to determine whether the
claim advanced by Hill was "'previously unavailable'" within the
meaning of the AEDPA. 142 Although the court had generally interpret-

134. Id. at 1264.
135. Id.
136. 113 F.3d 181 (11th Cir. 1997).
137. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (1994).
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

113 F.3d at 182 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)).
Id.
498 U.S. 39 (1990).
113 F.3d at 182.
Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)).
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ed the term "previously unavailable" with regard to the availability of
the claim at the time the first habeas application was filed, it emphasized that "we have eschewed reliance upon any mechanistic test when
assessing availability." 3 Instead, the court held that "a petitioner
intent upon establishing the 'unavailability' of the claim based upon a
new rule of constitutional law may also be required to demonstrate the
infeasibility of amending a habeas petition that was pending when the
new rule was announced." 1"
These principles regarding successive habeas petitions were particularly significant with respect to Hill's application." In his first habeas
proceeding, Hill was given numerous opportunities to amend his habeas
petition and was in fact encouraged on several occasions by the district
court to amend his petition to add a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, which Hill did not do.'" In addition, although the Supreme
Court did not issue its decision in Cage until seven months after Hill
had filed his original petition, the petition remained in the district court
for an additional three and one-half years following the Cage decision. 47 Consequently, the court found "that the circumstances of this
case conclusively refute Hill's contention that his Cage claim was
'previously unavailable' within the meaning" of the AEDPA.'"
Because Hill also failed to establish that the Supreme Court made Cage
claims "'retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review,'" the court
denied Hill's application to file a successive habeas petition. 49
XI.

PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT

In Mitchell v. Farcass,'"' the Eleventh Circuit addressed several
challenges to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"). 5' In Mitchell
an inmate brought a civil rights action against prison officials. Because
the inmate was granted in forma pauperis status, the district court
reviewed his complaint under the PLRA. 2 Under the PLRA a court
has the authority to dismiss a case brought by an inmate proceeding in
forma pauperis when the court finds that "the action or appeal--(i) is

143. Id. at 183.

144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id

148. Id. at 184.

149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(bX2)(A)).
112 F.3d 1483 (11th Cir. 1997).
28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1994).
Id. at 1485-86.
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frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may
granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief."" Upon finding that plaintiff's complaint
failed to state a claim, the district court dismissed the complaint, and
plaintiff appealed.'
Plaintiff argued that because he filed his complaint prior to April 26,
1996, the effective date of the PLRA, his complaint was not subject to
review under the PLRA.'" Generally, a newly enacted statute is not
given retroactive effect if, when applied to a pending case, it "(1) impairs
rights a party possessed when he or she acted, (2) increases a party's
liability for past conduct, or (3) 6imposes new duties with respect to
15
transactions already completed."
The court of appeals in this case summarily disposed of the second and
third factors because they "clearly have no application to this case, and
[plaintiffi makes no argument to the contrary." 57 Instead, the court
focused on the first factor, whether application of the statute would
impair plaintiff's rights as they existed at the time he filed his complaint.'
The court cautioned that the "'term "rights" as used in this
context should not be construed broadly so as to sweep within its ambit
mere expectation interests under procedural or remedy rules. ' " ' 9
Because the PLRA is wholly procedural, the court concluded that
plaintiff had nothing "more than an expectation interest" that the PLRA
would not apply to his complaint.' ° Consequently, the court determined that the PLRA could be applied retroactively to plaintiff's
complaint."'
XII. CONCLUSION
As in recent years, jurisdictional issues both at the trial and appellate
levels were at the forefront of the Eleventh Circuit's agenda in 1997.
While not reluctant to address issues of federal court jurisdiction, the
Eleventh Circuit continues to appear deferential in addressing the
impact of state law and state court jurisdiction. The impact of new as
well as old Supreme Court opinions helped shape Eleventh Circuit

153.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

154.

112 F.3d at 1486.

155. Id.

156. Id. at 1486-87 (citing Landraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994)).
157.
158.
159.
bane)).
160.
161.

Id. at 1487.
Id.
Id. (quoting Hunter v. United States, 101 F.3d 1565, 1572 (11th Cir. 1996) (en
Id.
Id.
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decisions in many substantive areas. There were also several issues of
first impression this year. As the cases featured in the Survey
demonstrate, the wide range of complexities of practice in the federal
arena requires a continued and close scrutiny of the ongoing developments in federal civil procedure.

